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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARTON W. M.ALMSTR·OM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
THERON c. 0 1LSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
10110 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
THERON C. OLSEN 
STATE·MENT OF ·CASE 
The appelllant has appealed from the decision 
of the Honorable R1ay Van Cott, Jr., Judge, Third 
Judicial District Court, dismissing the appellant's 
n1alpractice action against the respondent. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant brought the ins~tant actio .n 
against the respondent, a chiropractor,. cl\aiming she 
sustained injuries as a result of treatment negli-
gently rendered by the respondent. Mter presenta-
tion of the appellant's case, the trial c'ourt granted 
the respondent's motion to dismiss ruling that ap-
pellant had failed to present a prim·a facie case. 
1 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON A'PPEAL 
Respondent submits the trial court's action 
shou'ld be affirmed. 
STATE'MENT OF FAC'TS 
The respondent submits the followin'g statement 
of facts: 
On January 31, 1962, the appellant filed suit 
against the respon·dent, a duly licensed chiroprac-
tor offering services in Salt Lake 'County, alleging 
thlat as a result of negligent treatment, she had 
received from the respondent, she has sustained in-
juries to her neck (R-1). After several amended 
complaints had been filed (R-12, 27), the matter 
came on for jury tri1al on February 2·5, 26, 19164, 
before 'Ray Van Cott, Jr., Judge, presi'ding. After 
presentation of the plaintiff's ~ase, the trial court, 
upon motion of respondent, granted a dismissal, 
finding: 
"* * * th·at there was no evidence that he 
[reS'pondent] had failed to exercise the skill 
and care commensur1ate with accepted stan-
dards of chiropractic treatment in Salt Lake 
and vicinity." (R-36) 
The evidence 1disclosed th'at the appellant was 
a mature woman, 38 years old at the time of the 
tr~atment, was a surgical nurse at the L.D.S. Hos-
pital in Salt Lake City, had been a nurse since 1945, 
and was ~a registered nurse with a bachelor of sci-
en·ce degree in nursing education (R-4·3, 44, 80). 
2 
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On June 11, 1961, the appellant went to the office 
of the respondent at his home in S'alt Lake County 
afuar having been referred by a Dr. Poulter, another 
chiropractor from Ogden ( R-45) . The appellant had 
bflen suffering with low back pain since 1H49 (R-45) 
and had previously consulte'd chiropractors concern-
ing her condition (R-85, 91). 
The appellant advised the respondent of her 
condition an:d the referral and indicated th1at Dr. 
Poulter had X-rays of her spine which were avail-
able (R-46). The re'Spon'dent proceeded to treat the 
appellant by back man~ipul'ations. According to re-
spondent, the following occurred (R.-4'7): 
"A Yes. He had me take of my outer 
garments and put on a gown that he had and 
went into this room and he had 'a couch of 
some kind, or ta'ble, whatever it was, that he 
had me l~ay down on my ~abdomen. And he ran 
hi's hands up and down the back and pressed 
some way. I was on my 'abdomen and couldn't 
see him, just what I was feeling, and pressed 
on my back and somehow and -
Q Wh~at part of your back? 
A The lower back where I was having 
my difficulty. And then he had me on my 
abdomen with my ~ace to the side and m'ade 
a few motions with my head and took both 
hands and gave it a very rough jerk. 
Q What feelings did you have at that 
time? 
A Well, it certainly hurt. 
3 
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Q Did you say anything to the Doctor 
about it hurting? 
A Oh, I said, 'ouch.' 
Q What else ·did he do? 
A That was all. He was very brief. 
Then when the treatment was over I got 
dressed and my husband paid him and we 
left." 
T'he next day, the appellant went, with her 
husb,and, to the M'ain Street office of the respon-
dent for another treatment (R-48). Her testimony 
in thaJt respect was · ( R-49) : 
''A Well, I went into a room and re-
moved my outer garments .again and put on 
a gown. Anld I went into a room and he had 
quite a low couch with a head up by a door. 
And he again manipulated my spine. But be-
fore he did this my husband told him that he 
had injured my neck, or that he had hurt my 
neck the day before when he treated me and 
he said, ''Oh, I can fix that.' And he was in 
a big hurry and he said - just a moment. 
There were people around anld went out the 
1door for awhile and then he came back and 
he gave my neck another rough jerk adjust-
ment an'd that was the extent of the treat-
ment." 
The respondent asked her to return again, how-
ever, the appellant did not do so (R-49, 50). There-
after, the appell1ant went on vacation for nine days 
during which time she did not consult a physician 
and the pain she claimed to have sustained from the 
trea tmen~t subside'd partially ( R-92) . 
4 
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Subsequently, the appellant consulted Dr. Ar-
gyle, an 1\'l.D. an·d general practitioner, who gave 
her heat, clithermy treatments (R-'51-52). Therafter, 
on July 12, 1961, she consulted Dr. Thomas E. 
Baurnan, an orthopedic surgeon who prescribed 
slt\t\ping in traction and \finally hospitalization for 
traction ( R-52-55). 'The appelliant there~after was 
referred to Dr. D. ·c. Bern1son, who di·agnosed a 
ruptured or herniated disc in the upper back and 
neck area (R-128, 129). A spinal fusion of this area 
\Vas performed. Prior to the spinal fusion appellant 
gavP the followin·g statement con~erning her medical 
history to a Dr. Dawkins (R-87, 88): 
"* * * ' ... This '38 year old female who is em-
poyed in surgery at this hospital states that 
she knows of n'o incidence of twisting her 
neck, although she has h~ad several incidents 
of moderate trauma to the neck approxim!a:te-
ly one or two months ·ago, she has pain in the 
neck which sin·ce has been associated with p·ain 
an1d ·a feeling of pins an·d needles in the whole 
arm and occasional areas of numbness which 
iny·olve only the rigHt fifth finger and fourth 
finger . . . ' * * *" . 
In another medical report; the following ap-
pears ( R-88) : 
"* * * 'PRESENT ILLNESS: Approximate-
ly 7 to 8 weeks prior to admission, the p'atient 
was experien·cing a recurrent attack of her 
lumbosacrta..l and s~iatic p·ain and while at-
tempting to obtain some relief from these 
symptoms she rtULde a careless slip which re-
sulted ·in an acc~tte neck strain.' * * *" 
5 
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'The first operation was only partially success-
ful, !and a second fusion became necess·ary which 
was done on March 12, 19'62 ( R-612). On July 123, 
1962, the appellant returned to work (R-64). 
At the time of trial, the ·appellant testified that 
during her treatment by other chiropractors, she 
had had a similar form of treaJtment to th1at given 
by the respondent ( R-91 ) . This was confirmed by 
the appellant's husband who testified (R-113, 114): 
"Q H·ad you seen manipulations like 
that before? 
''A I had seen similar ones. 
"Q By other chiropr!actors, I suppose? 
"A Yes." 
The appellant primarily relied upon the testi-
mony of two medical doctors. Both doctors were 
the tre·atin~g physicians. ·The tri·al court refused to 
allow Dr. D. C. 'Bernson to testify as to the standard 
of care in this case, as to whether the treatment in 
this case was bad practice. The ·doctor had no knowl-
edge a 1s to whether the treatment rendered was in 
accordan·ce with proper chiropractic standards. He 
testified ( R-144) : 
"A No sir. What I said is referring 'to 'their 
knowledge. I said I don't ~have the same knowl-
edge, because I think I h!ave 'a great deal more 
knnw ledge th·an chiropractors. I am not an 
authority on chiropractic treatm·ent, sir. 
"THE COURT: And the methods they 
u~se? 
6 
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.. ~\ No, I am not. 
''Q And whether or not the one method 
used by one would be good or not, is that 
correct? 
''A That would be correct. 
"THE COUR·T: In other words, if Dr. 
Olsen did one thing you wouldn't know from 
the standpoint of chiropractics an'd procedure 
\Vhether or not it w.as correct or incorrect? 
"A Not on their standards, sir." 
Doctor Bernson did testify that it was "pos-
sible'' that discs could be ruptured by a sharp move-
rnent of the neck (R-130), ·an~d that from his an-
alysis, the rupture was "recent", but did not say 
how recent. Doctor B~aum1an also testified that a 
chiropractic neck manuipulation "could cause the 
condition" (R-158). Doctor Bauman also unfami-
liar with proper chiropractic standards in the com-
munity (R-161). He further 'testifield that the herni-
ation could be caused by some trauma in everyday 
activity (R-165). No evidence that the trea;tment 
given here was ·contrary to accepted chiropractic 
standards was offered. 
The trial court dismissed, and commented in 
part (R-200) : 
''So that there is no evidence here that this 
Doctor did use excessive force ·and if he dtd 
use excessive force there is no evidence th·at 
the kind of treatment that he gave ·her on 'that 
occasion was not the kind of treaJtment that 
7 
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was standard by chiropractors in this com-
munity and may have had a bad resullt with 
any other chiropractor. 
"'So that, as I say, there is nothing here in 
the way of expert medical testimony to show 
that the thin'g that Dr. Olsen di'd was not stan-
dard and he is to be judged as a chiropractor, 
not as a neurosurgeon or an orthopedic sur-
geon. They concedingly have greater skill or 
greater knowledge than the ·chiropractors. But 
chiroprac~ors are lawfully pra'Cticing their 
profession and manipulatiion of the spine and 
of the back as a part of their lawful practice 
an'd which they have a right to do. 
"There is no evidence that he wasn't doing 
that except that he had a bad result and we 
do not say there is negligence because an ac-
cident happened. I go out here on the street 
and h~ave an accident in an automobile, but 
it is no sign that I was negligent because I 
had an accident, nor would it be a sign if you 
di1d." 
Based on the above facts, it is submitted the 
trial court ruled correctly. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRikL CO·URT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
'THE TESTIMONY OF DOCTORS BAUMAN AND 
B'E,RNSON W·OULD NOT SUFFICE TO S'HOW THE 
.NPPROPRIATE STAN·DA'RD OF CARE. 
In the in'Stant case, the appell!ant contends that 
the 'testimony of Doctors ·B:auman and B'ernson 
sh)ould be sufficient to establish the negligence of 
8 
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the l'Pspondent. This contention simply will not 
stand. Neither Doctor Bauman nor Doctor Bernson 
indicated they were familiar wi1th the stand'ards of 
practice of chiropractics (R-144, 178). Therefore, 
neither Doctor could say whether the actions of the 
respondent were contrary to accepted standards of 
rhit·opractic practice in the community. There is no 
evidence in this case that the respondent in !anyway 
~ought to treat the appellant other than as a chiro-
prartol'. Therefor, can the testimony of the Doctors 
establ'ish the standard of care where by their own 
adn1issiuns they were unfamili'ar wilth the appro-
priatP standards of chiropractic treatment? Obvious-
ly not. The trial court refused to allow the doctors 
to testify as to whether the treatment given was bad 
practice. It is submitted that appell'ant's conten-
tion that the tesltimony of Doctors Bernson an·d 
Bauman establishes the appropriate standard and 
shows negligence fails on two bases : ( 1) There is 
no testimony of record of a1bandonment of proper 
standards, an·d (2) since the Doctors were unfami-
liar with proper standards, their testimony could 
not establish negligence. 
In Forrest v. Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 
178 ( 1953), the plaintiff sued a naturopathic phy-
sician for m~lpractice. The trial ·court grante:d a 
directed verdict. On appeal, this Court affirm·ed 
noting: 
.,,,Thether defendant was licensed to practice 
minor surgery is not clear, but 'immaterial 
9 
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here. The record does not indicate the plain-
tiff sustained the burden of provin·g defendant 
negl~gent. A ~laintiff, unable to rely on any 
res Ipsa loquitur theory, must prove negli-
gence in a case allegedly involving malpra·c-
tice. Civil liability does not depen·d necessarily 
on lack of statutory licensing qualification, 
but rather upon failure to exercise that de-
gree of care an·d skill considere·d proper by 
correct and accepted standards of the profes-
siun involved, or, stated otherwi~se, failure to 
use ~that care exercised by skille·d profession-
al men doing like work in the vicinity." 
The 'Court, therefore, recognized thalt there must be 
some evi'den'ce of the required standards of care 
before a plaintiff may recover. In this instance, no 
evidence of the required standards was received by 
the trial court. The su'bstance of the testimony of 
the two medical doctors was as to their treatment 
and diagnosis of the appellant. They were not al-
lowed to testify as to wheth·er the actions in this 
case constituted a departure from accepte'd prac .. 
tice of the chiropractic school. Indeed one of the 
Doctors indicated 'he would be unable to testify as 
to whether the treatment was proper because he 
could not divorce himself from his more specialized 
learning ( R-178). 'The appell'ant ·does not, by this 
appeal, contest the evidenti!ary ruling of the Court.! 
'1 In Walkenhorst v. Kesler, 9·2 Utah 312, 3'32, 67 P.2d 654 (1937), 
this !Coun-t, citing Martin 'V. Courtney, 75 Minn. 255, 77 NW 813, 
implied the m·atter of admitting such testimony is exclusively for 
the trial court. 
10 
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Therefore, the testimony of the two Doctors factu-
ally fails to show a departure from proper stand'ards. 
Secondly, where the Doctors were in fact un-
fanliliar with accepted standards of chiropradtic 
treatment, it would be ludicrous to contend their 
tP~timony could show negli'gence. It is, of course, rec-
ognized that a medical doctor must pass ex·amina-
tions .. generally required of candidates for the de-
gree of doctor of medicine by reputable medical 
colleges in the United States." 58-12-12, U.C.A., 
1953, and tllat for th·ose who practice without dru~gs 
or sur~;ery, a similar exam must be passed except-
ing ~'materi~a medi'ca, therapeutics, surgery, obslte-
trics and theory and practice." 58-12-13, U.C.A. 
1953. However, this does not mean that the law 
does not recognize the fact that various schools of 
n1edicine do differ. A chiropractor in fact does prac-
tice a \'"arying form of treatment than !an osteopath 
or allopathic physician. This 'being so, the stan'dard 
of care to be ·applied is that of the chiropractor, or 
other school of practice. Forrest v. Eason, 12'3 Utah 
610, 261 P.2d 178 ( 1953) ; Abos v. 1Vlartyn, 31 C'al. 
i\.pp. '2d 705, 88 P.2d 797 ( 19'39) ; Howe v. McCoy, 
113 Cal. App. 468, 298 Pac. 530 ( 19'31). Thus, in 19 
.-\.L.R. 2d 1198, It is stated: 
"Generally, a 'drugless practitioner or healer 
is entitled to have his treatment of his pa-
tient tested by the rules and principles of the 
school or system to which he belongs." 
11 
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Some courts have refused to allow p1hysicians 
to testify as to the standard of care applicable to a 
chiropractor. Sheppard v. Firth, 215 'Ore. 268, 334 
P.2d 190 (19·59); J,anssen v. Mulder, 232 Mich. 183, 
205 N.W. 159 (1925). In Bry~ant v. Biggs, 331 Mich. 
64, 49 N.W. 2d 63 (19'51), 'The Michigan Supreme 
c·ourt noted as to a physician's testimony against 
an osteopath: 
"In view of the repeated statements that he 
h1ad no knowledge of osteopathy or the meth-
ods or standards of practice generally of oste-
opathic practictioners, the conclusion neces-
sarily follows that he was not competent to 
testify whether the defendant exercised due 
and ·proper care . . . " 
'See Anno. 85 A.L.R. 2d 1022. 
However, in this case, the record is 'Completeiy 
absent ~of eviden·ce as to the proper standard of care 
because of lack of knowledge and an ina;l)ility of 
one doctor to divorce himself from his specialized 
training. T~he trial court was, therefore, clearly cor-
rect in its determination that there was no evidence 
from the testimony of the physici1ans to show re-
S'pondent departed from the proper 'Standarld of care. 
T~he Doctors simply did not know anything about 
medicine by spine manipulation. 
W~alkenhorst v. Kesler, supra, cited by appel-
lant, does not assist on this questi1on since there the 
testimony of the physician was a·dmitted, and sec-
ondly, the Court noted: 
12 
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"* • * The evidence submitted to the jury 
'vas sufficient to s·how appellant stepped out 
of the 'chiropractic' field when limited to pal-
pation, an'd the testimony in tfue light of the 
statute was admissible because appellant was 
charged with having diagn'osed and treated 
human ·ailments." 
This is not the case in the instant appeal, n~or 
did the Walkenhorst case involve a situation where 
the doctor, although unknowledgeable in chiroprac-
tics, indicated he could not testify as to the stan-
dard because he could not divorce himself from his 
more specialized knowledge n~ot required of chiro-
practors.2 Therefore, ~he case is inapropos in this 
instance. 
It follows, therefore, the 'appellant cannot argue 
\vith any success that the testimony of Doctors 
Bauman ·and Bernson estaJblished the stan·dard of 
this case and a departure therefrom. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW NEGlLIGENCE 
0~ THE PART OF THE RESPONDENT. 
The appellant, in Point I of her brief, argues 
that the evidence received ~by the Court establishes 
negligence on the part of the respondent. In orlder 
2 :r~ree defects. in Justice Moffat's opini'On and the reason why 
~he op1n1on of Justices Wolfe and Folland may be more persuasive 
m the future is ( 1) the majority never determined what was en-
compassed by "materia 1nedica, thereapeuties, surg~ry, obstetrics 
and theory and practice" so that standards ·where applicable were 
n~ver defined, (2) that a person is legally qualified is substantially 
drfferent than actual knowledge, and ( 3) the legislature never in-
tended the registration law to determine tort liability (see Forrest 
v. Eason, supra). 
13 
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for the plaintiff to recover in a malpractice action 
. ' It is necessary for the proof to show (1) the appro-
priate standard of medical treatment for the school 
of practice invdlved, and ( 2) 'a departure from these 
standards. 
There mere fact of injury or an unsuccessful 
result will not support a finding of negligence. In 
Ritter v. Sivils, 206 Ore. 410, 2193 P.2d 211 (1956), 
a malpractice action was brought against a chiro-
practor. The Court stated: 
"A chiropractor is not a warrantor of cure, 
an·d if a good result does not ensue from his 
efforts the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is 
not ·available to his erst while patient." 
The Utah Supreme Court has followed this 
standard in me1dical practitioner cases in the past. 
The concept of res ipsa locquitur is not applicable 
to medical ·ma11practice cases in Utah. Forrest v. 
Eason, 123 Utah 610, 261 P.2d 178 (1953); Walk-
enhorst v. Kesler, 92 Utah 312, 67 P.2d 654 (1H3'7); 
Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, ·2 P.2d 2:57 (1931). 
Affirm~ative evidence must be offered by showing 
(1) what the recognized medical standards are in 
the community; ('2) a departure from those stan .. 
dards due to neglect; ('3) damage as the proximate 
result of such departure. Utah has adopte(} the posi-
tion th,at proof of medical standards, and neglect 
in not maintaining those standards, as well as proxi-
mate cause must be shown by expert testimony. 
14 
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Thus, in Anderson v. Nixon, 104 Utah 262, 139 
P.2d '216 (l!l -l:i), the UtaJh Supreme Court stated: 
~'• • • ,,.hat is the ordinary care and skill re-
quirE)d of a doctor in the community in which 
he serves n1ust necessarily depen'd upon ex-
pert tE.)stimony." 
In 41larsh v. Pemberton, 10 U. 2d 40, 347 P.2d 
1108 ( 19;-)~l), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
~'A physician or surgeon is not an insurer of 
a successful result and therefore no presump-
tion of negligence is to be indulged from the 
fact of an adverse result of his treatment or 
operation on a patient. This court held in 
Edwards v. Cl'ark: 
'In order to recover in such case the 
plaintiff must show that in trea'tment 
of the patient the defendant physician 
did not exercise such care and diligence 
as is ordinarily exercised by skilled phy-
sicians doing the same type of work in 
the vicinity, and ~hat the want or railure 
of the required skill and care was the 
cause of the injury complained of. :That 
there might have ~been neglect or lack 
of ski'll is not en'ough. To permit a ·cause 
to go to the jury on testimony showing 
only possilbility, or Wh'at might or could 
have happened, is to permit 'a jury to base 
a verdict upon conjecture, speculat1on or 
suspicion.' 
~'See also Baker v. Wycoff, 9'5 Utah 19'9, 79 
P. 2d 77; 
"Baxter v. Snow, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.'21d 2157. 
"The ordinary care and skill required of a 
15 
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doctor in the community in Which he serves 
must necessarily be established by expert tes-
timony. This court has held that expert testi-
mony 'is unnecessary to establish liability in 
malpractice cases only where the question of 
propriety of treatment of a patient by a phy-
sician is a matter of comm'On knowledge of 
laymen or when a p·hysici'an shows a gross 
neglect or want of care and skill such as leav-
in'g medical supplies in the incision of a pa-
tient. 
"This case does not fit any of the above ex-
ceptions. It is certainly not within the com-
mon knowledge of a laym'an as to how tight 
a cast should be applied to a foot following 
a 'triple arthrodesis' operation. Evidence was 
introduced to the effect that the swelling ac-
companying su·ch an operation could be dif-
ferent with every in1dividu~al; therefore the 
ti'gh1tness of the cast and the amount of pad-
ding necessary is a matter of judgment exer-
cised by the physician. A physician is gener-
ally liable for misjudgment only when he ar-
rived at such judgment through fa'ilure to 
use ordin!ary care and skill or was guilty of 
misattention or neglect. 
"In the absence of ·a standard of care estab-
l1ised ·by expert medical testimony and some 
evidence showing a deviation from this ~t~n­
dard it must be presumed that the physiCI!ln 
skillfully operated on and treated the plain-
tiff. To allow the question of negligence t~ be 
submitted to the jury without first est.abhsh-
ing a standard of care would allow a JUry to 
indulge in ·a type of speculation not generally 
allowed. 
16 
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"This is neither the type of case that is with-
in the con1mon knowledge of laymen nor can 
it hl\ said that a standa1·d was established by 
the testimony of the defendant physician. 
Counsel for the plaintiff in attempting to es-
tablish a ~tanclarcl of care by the defendant's 
testitnony posed several hypothetical questions 
to the defendant asking 'him to assume facts 
that \vere neYer proved. To submit the ques-
tion of liability to the jury under such cir-
cumstances would be to ~base a verdict upon 
a 1nere possibility of negligence. It is seldom 
that a doctor's standard of care, 'because it is 
so specialized, is known or is with1in the knowl-
edge of a layman. We believe this case to be 
the type that required expert testimony as 
to 'a standard of care and that the failure of 
the plaintiff to call an expert medical witness 
and establish such a standard was fatal to ·his 
recovery.'' 
St.)l\ also Annotation 81 A.L.R. 2d 59'7. 
The 'appellant, however, conten'ds that even 
though there is no testimony showin'g a departure 
fron1 acceptable standards of chiropractic treatment 
that this case is one where the circumstances sur-
rounding the claimed injury establish negligence in 
the absence ·of expert testimony. The tri!al court 
carefully considered this allegation as a·gainst the 
situation in Baxter v. Snolv, 78 Utah 217, 2 P.2d 
25i (1931), and determined that this case, like the 
facts of Baxtet, will not support such a contention. 
This Court, in Fredrickson v. Maw, 119 Utah 385, 
227 P.2d 772 (1951), did recognize that where the 
17 
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facts are such that ordinary laymen may find a 
'departure from ·proper treatment, the case m'ay go 
to the jury in the absence of expert testimony. That 
case, however, involved the leaving of a surgical 
sponge in the wound after a tonsillectomy. The 
sponge cases, however, are a unique departure from 
the general rule requirin'g expett testimony. McCoid, 
Liability of Medical Pr,actitioners, Professional 
_Negligence, p. 74 (1960). T·he appellant has cited 
a few cases supporting a case of negli'gence against 
chiropractors and other healing practitioners appar-
ently on the basis of injury. However, the facts of 
'those cases are substan'ti!ally more aggravate'd than 
those now before the court. In Farrah v. Patton, 99 
Colo. 41, S9 P.2d 76 (1936), the facts showed a 
terrific snap form of manipulation of the patient's 
neck by the osteopa:th followed by the onset of in-
tense pain !and vomiting. 'The doctor himself ad-
mitted at the time that he had been "a little rough". 
The patient was unable to swallow, and paralysis 
on the right side of the patient's body occurred im-
mediately. T·hi1s is a substantially different situation 
that is involved here. The appellant noticed only 
sli'ght pain, which subsided subsequently while on 
her vacation. The treatment of her spine and neck 
was not ·couple'd with intense injury thereafter, nor 
was there the "terrific" jerk, etc. which was in-
volved in Farnah. In a m'ore recent case, the Colo-
r~do Supreme ~court noted 'that a '~terrific yank" 
18 
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i~ not enough to show negligent treatment. In Klim-
kielvic;; l'. Kar·nick, 372 P.2d 736 (Colo., 1962), the 
Court stated: 
"The plaintiff does not claim improper diag-
nosis ; she expressly admits that the technique 
that defendant alleges he used as proper chiro-
practic treatn1ent and that the method which 
demonstrated as that used was proper. Thus 
\\.l) find that plain tiff's complaint is confined 
to the fact that defen'dant gave 'her arm a 
'tremendous yank'. This was part of the ad-
mitted 'proper chiropractic treatment'. In giv-
ing this 'tremendous yank' as related by plain-
tiff, or in applyin'g 'a mild firm extention ... 
to the arm', as related by defendant - no 
matter wHich version is correc't - the :de-
fendant's actions were those of a doctor under 
cont1·actural obligations, and the propriety 
of the sa1ne must be measured by the rules 
governing one in his position." 
In Nelson v. Dahl, 174 Minn. 574, 219 N.W. 
941 (1928), a chiropractor under spinal adjust-
ments on a patient and during the course of treat-
ment died. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated: 
" '"rhen a doctor accepts ·professional employ-
nlent, he is only required 'to exerci'se such 
reasonable care an·d s'kill as is usually exer-
cised by doctors in 'good standing of the same 
school of prac'tice. When a patient selects one 
of the several recognized schools of treatment, 
he thereby adopts an·d accepts the kind of 
treatment common to that school; and the 
care, skill, and diligence with which he is 
treated, when that becomes a question in the 
courts of this state, must be tested by the evi-
dence of those who are trained and 'Skilled in 
19 
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that particular school of treatment. In actions 
of this character the plaintiff must show that 
the result concerning which complaint is made 
was due to negligence or unskiiful 'treatment. 
In this case no negligence is 'shown. The fact 
that the patient died soon after the adjust-
ment is not significant. Negligence is not pre-
sumed from results. Appellant stres'ses the 
failure to diagnose, 'to recognize the presence 
of diseases by their symptoms, but the schuol 
of the c'hiropractors seems to limit its field of 
operation to the spine and 'to making 'the ab-
normal normal. It would seem that such could 
seldom 'have harmful consequences. 'Those en-
ga'ged in chiropractic treatments must, of 
course, h·ave regard to the presence of such 
ailments as might be aggravated by adjust-
ments of 'the spine - if such adjustments do 
in 'fact aggravate any .ailments. Plaintiff 
sought a new trial upon the ground of newly 
discovered eviden·ce which is directed to the 
duty of a chiropractor to make a general ex-
amination of his patient before giving a treat-
men1t . . . Such evi1dence was apparently not 
produced because counsel expe·cted to prove 
thi's issue by an allopathic doctor, which was 
not permissible. T'he moti'On was also address-
ed to the discretion of the trial court.' " 
In the instant case, the facts show none of the 
circumstan·ces that would bring this case under the 
exception to the rule requiring expert evidence. This 
case is not different from Baxter v. Snow, supra, 
where this 'Court rejected such a contention.3 The 
3 For the s·ame reason, a'S well as the fact that expert testimony 
as to standard was offered, Hinthorn v. Garrison, 108 Kan. 510, 196 
Pac. 439 (11921) does not support the appellant. 
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appellant went to the respondent suffering fron1 
low back pain. She was a mature woman, famili,ar 
with 1nedicine and chiropractics and educated as a 
nurse. The treatment given her ;by the respon·dent 
based on the testimony of her husband .and herself 
\Vas similar to that given ·by other chiropractors. 
The respondent did not purport to diagnose or go 
outside the field of chiropractics. Although she no-
tired pain du1·ing the treatments, it was not by her 
own admission intense or excruciating. After the 
treatn1ents, she wen't o·n vacation, ~and the discom-
fort subsided to some extent. Although the subse-
quent diagnoses by the testifyin·g physicians was 
of ruptured or herniated discs, it was admitted that 
other activities may cause such a problem. The prac-
tice of ch1ropractics involves m~anipulation of the 
spine; Board of Medioal Ex.aminers v. Freenor, 47 
Utah 430, 154 Pac. 941 (1'9'1'6); consequently, the 
n1ere fact that the respondent made such manipula-
tions cannot be evidence of negligence. 'The amount 
of force and propriety of treatment, in the absence 
of clear eYidence of unprofessional conduct, is a 
matter of judgment and expertise in the school and 
expert evidence must define the area where judg-
nlent ends and negligence begins. Coon v. Shields, 88 
Utah 76, 39 P.2d 348 ( 1934). The appellant con-
tends that since the doctors testified a ruptured disc 
could occur or was possible during chiropractic m~an­
ipulation, that such when coupled with the evidence 
makes out negligence. In Moore v. D. & R. G. W. 
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R. R. Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 29'2 P.2d 849 (1956), an 
expert testified that "it was possible" that the acci-
dent caused a ruptured inter-vertebral disc. The 
Court 'hld that pl:aintiff ha'd failed to meet his bur-
den. The Court stated: 
". . . the plain tiff retains his burden of prov-
ing his ·damages by competent evidence to an 
extent where 'the trier of fact might discover 
that which is probably true, having regard 
for the certainty or uncertainty which is more 
or less inherent in every issue of fact.'' 
Certainly where the eviden·ce shows no depar-
ture from standards of reasonable practice, where 
the appllant herself in reciting her medical history 
discounts the very claim she sues on, the evidence 
will not in any event support an award. The trial 
court painstakingly considered the issue and re-
view~d the evidence against the precedents after 
viewing and hearing the testimony. An analysis of 
the trial court's action, the evidence and the law 
discloses no basis for reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant was given every reasonable lati-
tude by the trial court to make right a case demon-
strating the respondent's negligence. The simplest 
and easiest way to have done so would have been to 
call a witness from the same discipline as the respon-
dent to testify relating to the appropriate standard 
22 
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of care and the claimed departure from reasonable 
tt·eatrnent. The appellant instead attempted to reJy 
upon allopathic physicians whose personal an'd pro-
ft.l~sional prejudices against chiropractors and drug-
lP~s physicians are obvious. Further, the appellant 
sought to rely upon the fact 'df injury itself to sup-
port her claims. Both of these tactics are unsupport-
able in law, and the evidence afforded the appellant 
no basis for relief against the respondent. The trial 
court correctly dismissed appellant's cause of action. 
This Cout should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HAN'S!ON & BALDWIN 
Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Theron C. Olsen 
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